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WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
[t]he first inquiry under the "plain error rule" codified in Rule
52(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure is whether
"error" in fact has been committed. Deviation from a rule of law
is error unless it is waived. Waiver is the intentional
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right. When there has
been such a knowing waiver, there is no error and the inquiry as to
the effect of the deviation from a rule of law need not be
determined." 7
G. Cumulative Error Doctrine
Application of the cumulative error doctrine in civil litigation was
addressed in Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation, Inc."' The opinion held
that "[t]he cumulative error doctrine may be applied in a civil case when it is
apparent that justice requires a reversal of a judgment because the presence of
several seemingly inconsequential errors has made any resulting judgment
inherently unreliable."5"9
XXI. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Free Speech Clause
The case of In re Hey59 provided Justice Cleckley with an opportunity to
construe the constitutional right of free speech for judicial officials:
A judge may not be disciplined consistent with the First
Amendment to the United States Constitution or with Section 7 of
Article III of the West Virginia Constitution for his remarks during
a radio interview in which he discussed his own disciplinary
proceeding, criticized a member of his investigative panel, and
stated his intention to take some reactive and lawful measure
against the panel member. 91
587 Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.
588 459 S.E.2d 374 (W. Va. 1995).
589 Id. at Syl. Pt. 8.
590 452 S.E.2d 24 (W. Va. 1994).
591 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
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The decision in Hey went on to clarify the right of judicial officials to free speech
and the right of the state to encroach upon that freedom. Justice Cleckley held that
"[t]he State may accomplish its legitimate interests and restrain the public
expression of its judges through narrowly tailored limitations where those interests
outweigh the judges' free speech interests."5"
Governmental infringement upon the right to run for political office was
addressed in the context of the state constitution in State ex rel. Billings v. City of
Point Pleasant.93 The opinion initially ruled as a general matter that "[t]he West
Virginia Constitution confers a fundamental right to run for public office, which the
State cannot restrict unless the restriction is necessary to accomplish a legitimate
and compelling governmental interest."94 The opinion then held that
[r]estrictions that limit an individual's ability to select and change
his or her party affiliation implicate the speech and associational
freedoms guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution and by Sections 7 and 16 of Article III of the West
Virginia Constitution. Such restrictions cannot be imposed on
these rights unless the restrictions are necessary to accomplish a
legitimate and compelling governmental interest and there is no
less restrictive means of satisfying such interest.595
Justice Cleckley then applied the constitutional legitimate and compelling
governmental interest test to the specific statute at issue in the case:
The provision in W. Va. Code, 3-5-7(b)(6) (1991), which
effectively disqualifies from running for political office individuals
who change their political party affiliation within sixty days of
filing their announcements of candidacy, is necessary to
accomplish the compelling governmental interest in preserving the
integrity of the political process, promoting party stability, and
avoiding voter confusion. The provision, therefore, does not violate
either the fundamental right of candidacy or the right to change
592 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2
593 460 S.E.2d 436 (W. Va. 1995).
594 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
595 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
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political party affiliations.596
B. Due Process Clause
In State ex rel. Roy Allen S. v. Stone97 it was succinctly held that "[i]n
determining whether a law violates the Due Process Clause in Section 10 of Article
III of the West Virginia Constitution, the first step is to determine whether the
challenged provision implicates a liberty or property interest." '98 The decision next
addressed the constitutional interest of an unwed biological father to his child:
Although an unwed father's biological link to his child does not,
in and of itself, guarantee him a constitutional stake in his
relationship with that child, such a link combined with a
substantial parent-child relationship will do so. When an unwed
father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of
parenthood by coming forward to participate in the rearing of his
child, his interest in personal contact with his child acquires
substantial protection under the Due Process Clause in Section 10
of Article III of the West Virginia Constitution.'"
The voluntariness of a defendant's confession was argued on due process
grounds in State v. Honaker.6 0 In ruling on this matter Justice Cleckley deemed it
necessary to overrule precedent on a specific issue. The opinion held that "[p]olice
involvement must be evident before a statement is considered involuntary under the
West Virginia Due Process Clause. To the extent that State v. Sanders, 161 W. Va.
399,242 S.E.2d 554 (1978), and State v. Muegge, 178 W. Va. 439, 360 S.E.2d 216
(1987), hold otherwise, they are expressly overruled." ' The opinion clarified the
limit of constitutional due process considerations in relation to police conduct and
the peculiar characteristics of a defendant:
596 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
597 474 S.E.2d 554 (W. Va. 1996).
598 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
599 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
600 454 S.E.2d 96 (W. Va. 1994).
601 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
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Police involvement is a prerequisite for finding a confession
involuntary. Under the West Virginia Constitution, the
voluntariness of a confession for due process purposes turns solely
on the constitutional acceptability of the specific police conduct at
issue. While the personal characteristics of a defendant may be
considered in determining the admissibility of a confession under
Rules 401 through 403 of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence,
personal characteristics such as the mental condition or the
subjective state of mind of a defendant by themselves and apart
from their relation to official or police involvement are not
significant in deciding the voluntariness question. 2
Constitutional due process was an issue in the case of Board of Education
of County ofMercer v. Wirt. °3 That case involved the question of a pre-termination
hearing for a tenured educational employee. Justice Cleckley created a qualified
right to such a pre-termination hearing:
Under W. Va. Code, 18A-2-8 (1990), due process requires a
pre-termination hearing of a tenured employee under W. Va. Code,
18A-2-6 (1989). It is not necessary for a pre-termination hearing
to be a full adversarial evidentiary hearing; however, an employee
is entitled to a written notice of the charges, an explanation of the
evidence, and an opportunity to respond prior to a Board of
Education's decision to terminate the employee. If an employee
presents a danger to students or others at work and there is no
reasonable way to abate the danger, a pre-termination hearing is
not required.60
The case of Abshire v. Cline 5 examined constitutional due process in the
context of a driver's license. The opinion made clear at the outset that "[a] driver's
license is a property interest and such interest is entitled to protection under the Due
Process Clause of the West Virginia Constitution."' The opinion then announced
602 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
603 453 S.E.2d 402 (W. Va. 1994).
604 Id at Syl. Pt 3.
605 455 S.E.2d 549 (W. Va. 1995).
606 Id at Syl. Pt. 1.
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the constitutional limit placed upon revocation of a driver's license without a
hearing taking place:
On its face, a requirement by the Department of Motor Vehicles
that a request for a continuance must be received at least five days
prior to a scheduled hearing is not an unconstitutional or
unreasonable rule. However, when a request is made and, by no
fault of the licensee or his or her counsel, the request is not
received by the Department of Motor Vehicles at least five days
prior to the hearing, the rule may not be applied to deny the
licensee the opportunity to demonstrate a "good cause" reason for
continuing the hearing. 7
In State v. Guthrie, 8 Justice Cleckley held that
[ain appellate court is obligated to see that the guarantee of a fair
trial under Section 10 of Article III of the West Virginia
Constitution is honored. Thus, only where there is a high
probability that an error of due process proportion did not
contribute to the criminal conviction will an appellate court affirm.
High probability requires that an appellate court possess a sure
conviction that the error did not prejudice the defendant.6 9
The case of West Virginia Human Rights Commission v. Garretson"° called
upon Justice Cleckley to address due process rights in the context of litigating a
discrimination claim. The opinion held initially that
[i]ndividuals who timely file discrimination complaints with the
West Virginia Human Rights Commission have a property interest
in their claims for relief, and their property interest cannot be
extinguished except upon a finding on the merits of their claims or
upon a showing of good cause related to the complainants' actions
607 Id. at Syl. PL 2.
608 461 S.E.2d 163 (W. Va. 1995).
609 Id. at Syl. Pt. 11.
610 468 S.E.2d 733 (W. Va. 1996).
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or failure to act.6 '
The opinion went on to hold that
[d]ismissal of a Fair Housing Act claim, which had been timely
and properly filed with the Human Rights Commission, because of
that agency's failure to timely remove the case to circuit court as
provided in W. Va. Code 5-11A-13(o)(1) (1992), would deprive
the complainant of his property interest in the right to redress of
discrimination and to a decision on the merits of his charge and
would thus violate the Due Process Clause in Article III, § 10 of
the West Virginia Constitution.1
In Tennant v. Marion Health Care Foundation, Inc.,13 the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals considered the effect, on a trial, of an appearance of
judicial impropriety:
A claim of an appearance of impropriety does not rise to the level
of a fundamental defect in due process requiring a new trial.
Absent a showing of bias or prejudice, a new trial is unwarranted
when (1) there has been a full trial on the merits, (2) there is no
obvious error during the original proceedings, (3) the record shows
it is extremely unlikely the prejudice could have affected the trial,
and (4) the failure to disclose facts leading to a disqualification
motion was inadvertent.
14
C. Article IV, Section 8
The state officer salary provision found in Article IV, section 8 of the state
constitution was the subject in State ex rel. West Virginia Board of Education v.
Gainer."' The case addressed the issue of whether the legislature or the state board
of education had authority to set the salary of the state superintendent of schools.
611 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
612 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
613 459 S.E.2d 374 (W. Va. 1995).
614 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
615 452 S.E.2d 733 (W. Va. 1994).
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In deciding that the authority rested with the legislature, Justice Cleckley wrote that
"[t]he legislature, in cases not provided for in th[e] Constitution, shall prescribe, by
general laws, the terms of office, powers, duties and compensation of all public
officers and agents, and the manner in which they shall be elected, appointed and
removed.
6 16
D. Article VIII, Section 3
In State ex rel. Frazier v. Meadows, 617 a bright line was set out as to which
organ of government had authority to resolve problems involving court personnel.
The opinion held as a general matter:
The Judicial Reorganization Amendment provides a hierarchy to
be used in resolving administrative conflicts and problems. Under
the Amendment, the Judiciary, not the executive branch, is vested
with the authority to resolve any substantial, genuine, and
irreconcilable administrative conflicts regarding court personnel.6 8
The opinion then addressed the specific issue of a court's bailiff. Justice Cleckley
wrote that "[a] sheriff's right to initially select a court's bailiff may not obstruct a
court's inherent power to control the administration of justice and conduct orderly
judicial proceedings. 619
E. Grand Jury Clause
In State v. Adams,620 Justice Cleckley affirmed the constitutional guarantee
that "[a] defendant has a right under the Grand Jury Clause of Section 4 of Article
III of the West Virginia Constitution to be tried only on felony offenses for which
a grand jury has returned an indictment." 621
616 Id. Syllabus.
617 454 S.E.2d 65 (W. Va. 1994).
618 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
619 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
620 456 S.E.2d 4 (W. Va. 1995).
621 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
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F. Search and Seizure Clause
An investigatory stop of a suspect by police was the constitutional subject
in State v. Jones.6' Justice Cleckley elaborated upon this area:
If the police merely question a suspect on the street without
detaining him against his will, Section 6 of Article III of the West
Virginia Constitution is not implicated and no justification for the
officer's conduct need be shown. At the point where a reasonable
person believes he is being detained and is not free to leave, then
a stop has occurred and Section 6 of Article III is triggered,
requiring that the officer have reasonable suspicion that criminal
activity is afoot. If the nature and duration of the detention arise
to the level of a full-scale arrest or its equivalent, probable cause
must be shown. Thus, the police cannot seize an individual, take
him involuntarily to a police station, and detain him for
interrogation purposes while lacking probable cause to make an
arrest.6
G. Confrontation Clause
In State v. Mason,62 Justice Cleckley elaborated upon the constitutional
right of a criminal defendant to cross-examine an adverse witness. The opinion
began by holding generally that
[t]he mission of the Confrontation Clause found in the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14 of
Article III of the West Virginia Constitution is to advance a
practical concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining process
in criminal trials, and the touchstone is whether there has been a
satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.
An essential purpose of the Confrontation Clause is to ensure an
opportunity for cross-examination. In exercising this right, an
accused may cross-examine a witness to reveal possible biases,
622 456 S.E.2d 459 (W. Va. 1995).
623 Id. at Syl. Pt. 2.
624 460 S.E.2d 36 (W. Va. 1995).
Special]
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prejudices, or motives.6'
Mason next focused upon the admissibility of a third-party confession
during the trial of a defendant. Justice Cleckley held that
[a]bsent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,
the admission of a third-party confession implicating a defendant
violates the Confrontation Clause found in the Sixth Amendment
to the United States Constitution and Section 14 of Article III of
the West Virginia Constitution. The burden is squarely upon the
prosecution to establish the challenged evidence is so trustworthy
that adversarial testing would add little to its reliability.
Furthermore, unless an affirmative reason arising from the
circumstances in which the statement was made provides a basis
for rebutting the presumption that a hearsay statement is not
worthy of reliance at trial, the Confrontation Clause requires
exclusion of the out-of-court statement. 26
The decision in Mason qualified its position on hearsay statements. Justice
Cleckley wrote that "[f]or purposes of the Confrontation Clause found in the Sixth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section 14 of Article III of the
West Virginia Constitution, no independent inquiry into reliability is required when
the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception.6 27 Mason then held
that
[e]ven if the hearsay does not fit within an established exception,
its admissibility is not barred by the Confrontation Clause found in
the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section
14 of Article III of the West Virginia Constitution if, considered
apart from any corroborating evidence, there is a showing of
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Consideration should
be given to the totality of the circumstances that surround the
making of the statement and that render the declarant particularly
worthy of belief - so worthy of belief that the test of
cross-examination would be a work of supererogation. The
625 Id. at Syl. Pt. 1.
626 Id. at Syl. Pt. 9.
627 Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.
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guarantees of trustworthiness must be at least as reliable as
evidence admitted under a firmly rooted hearsay exception. An
affirmative reason, arising from the circumstances in which the
statement was made, is necessary to rebut the presumption of
unreliability and exclusion under the Confrontation Clause.628
The decision concluded by holding that
[a] trial court specifically must examine whether the circumstances
existing at the time a declarant gives a statement make the
statement particularly worthy of belief so that the test of
cross-examination would have been a work of supererogation. As
no mechanical test prevails, the character of the guarantees of
trustworthiness must be weighed.629
H. Jury Clause
In State v. Phillips,63 Justice Cleckley narrowed the reach of a claim of
denial of an impartial jury in a criminal proceeding. The opinion held,
[a] trial court's failure to remove a biased juror from a jury panel
does not violate a defendant's right to a trial by an impartial jury
as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the
United States Constitution and by Section 14 of Article I of the
West Virginia Constitution. In order to succeed in a claim that his
or her constitutional right to an impartial jury was violated, a
defendant must affirmatively show prejudice. 31
L Article XII, Section 1
Justice Cleckley articulated a constitutional rebuttable presumption of free
public education in Randolph County Board of Education v. Adams.632 The opinion
628 Id. at Syl. Pt. 10.
629 Id. at Syl. Pt. 11.
630 461 S.E.2d 75 (W. Va. 1995).
631 Id at Syl. Pt. 7.
632 467 S.E.2d 150 (W. Va. 1995).
Special]
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found in no uncertain terms that
[w]hatever items are deemed necessary to accomplish the goals of
a school system and are in fact an integral fundamental part of the
elementary and secondary education must be provided free of
charge to all students in order to comply with the constitutional
mandate of a free school system pursuant to Section 1 of Article
Xn of the West Virginia Constitution.633
It was then held that
Section 1 of Article XII of the West Virginia Constitution creates
a strong presumption in favor of making everything that is deemed
a necessary component to public education cost-free. When a
board of education seeks to charge parents for their children's
participation in public education, the board bears a heavy burden
in rebutting this constitutionally based presumption.634
J. Double Jeopardy Clause
The court said in State v. Sears63 that "[t]he purpose of the Double
Jeopardy Clause is to ensure that sentencing courts do not exceed, by the device of
multiple punishments, the limits prescribed by the legislative branch of government,
in which lies the substantive power to define crimes and prescribe punishments."636
Justice Cleckley also held that "[u]nder Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299,
52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L. ED. 306 (1932), if two statutes contain identical elements of
proof, the presumption is that double jeopardy principles have been violated unless
there is a clear and definite statement of intent by the Legislature that cumulative
punishment is permissible. 637
633 Id. at Syl. Pt. 7.
634 Id at Syl. Pt. 3.
635 468 S.E.2d 324 (W. Va. 1996).
636 Id at Syl. Pt. 3.
637 Id at Syl. Pt. 5.
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K Article XIV, Section 2
Justice Cleckley addressed the issue of properly amending the state
constitution in State ex rel. Cooper v. Caperton:638
The procedures set forth in Section 2 of Article XIV of the West
Virginia Constitution are designed to achieve two goals: (1) to
ensure, through the endorsement of a legislative supermajority and
the support of a majority of those voting in a statewide referendum,
that constitutional amendments reflect a true and broad based
political consensus; and (2) to guarantee that such a referendum
may be held only after the Legislature has taken steps to inform the
electorate fully and accurately about the proposed amendment. 69
The opinion then set out the general requirements for bringing about an amendment
to the state constitution:
No amendment to the West Virginia Constitution can be effected
without: (1) the duly recorded concurrence of two-thirds of the
members in each house; (2) the submission of the proposed
amendment to the people; (3) the amendment's ratification by a
majority of those voting in a statewide referendum; (4) the
fulfillment of the legislative duty to inform the people about the
proposed amendment through at least substantial compliance with
the directives of Section 2 of Article XIV of the West Virginia
Constitution and in a manner sufficient to permit the voters to
make up their minds; and (5) an absence of evidence that the
State's voter education mislead or confused the voters if not in
strict compliance with Article XIV. 4
The decision then addressed the specific issue of publication requirements
in bringing about an amendment to the state constitution. "Section 2 of Article XIV
of the West Virginia Constitution requires the Legislature to cause the full text of
a proposed amendment to be published in a newspaper in each of the State's
counties having a newspaper and any departures from that requirement shall be
638 470 S.E.2d 162 (W. Va. 1996).
639 Id. at Syl. Pt. 3.
640 Id. at Syl. Pt. 4.
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strictly reviewed." '' The opinion concluded that
[w]hen the State fails to publish the full text of a proposed
amendment in a newspaper in each county but instead publishes a
summary of the amendment, the results of a referendum on the
amendment'will not be set aside if: (1) the summary fully, fairly,
and accurately describes the amendment; (2) the summary is, in
fact, more understandable than the actual text of the amendment;
(3) the summary was adopted by the Legislature; (4) there was no
probative evidence that the summary mislead voters or reasonably
could be read to have had a misleading effect; and (5) there was no
probative evidence that publication of the full text of the
amendment would have made any difference in the outcome of the
referendum.42
XXII. CONCLUSION
As a dedicated member of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals,
Justice Cleckley enriched the jurisprudence of our state. This article has attempted
to honor him for the vision he brought to the court. The task that now confronts the
Bar and Judiciary of our state, is that of seizing Justice Cleckley's vision as we
litigate into the twenty-first century. Thank you, dear friend.
Id. at Syl. Pt. 6.
642 Id. at Syl. Pt. 5.
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